A New Attack on Link-State Database in Open Shortest Path First Routing Protocol

Esmail Kaffashi; Ahmad Madadi Mousavi; Hamid Rezaei Rahvard; Sahar Hemmatian Bojnordi; Forough Khademsadegh; Soheila Amirian

doi:doi:10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19

A New Attack on Link-State Database in Open Shortest Path First Routing Protocol

Esmail Kaffashi, Ahmad Madadi Mousavi, Hamid Rezaei Rahvard, Sahar Hemmatian Bojnordi, Forough Khademsadegh, Soheila Amirian

Published in Journal of Electrical and Electronic Engineering (Volume 3, Issue 2-1)

Received: 10 December 2014 Accepted: 13 December 2014 Published: 30 December 2014

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Abstract

Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol known as interior gateway of routing protocol is a major competitor for Cisco's EIGRP of a special routing protocol. Most attacks on this protocol are based on LSA fake router which the attacker has control over it. These attacks can affect the part of the routing domain or cause severe damage based on the strategic location of the router in the AS to bring domain routing. Attacks that cause much damage to a network security mechanism and enables fight-back will not have effect on routing domain. In this paper we will describe an attack that can arbitrarily change the routing domain routing table with harmfully threats without fight back mechanism enabled.

Published in	Journal of Electrical and Electronic Engineering (Volume 3, Issue 2-1) This article belongs to the Special Issue Research and Practices in Electrical and Electronic Engineering in Developing Countries
DOI	10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19
Page(s)	39-45
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2014. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Security, Routing Protocols, Link-State, OSPF, New Attack

References

[1]	Russell Chris, Security of IP Routing Protocols, SANS Institute, Global Information Assurance Certification Paper, October 7, 2001.
[2]	Andrew A. Vladimirov, Konstantin V. Gavrilenko, Hacking Exposed Cisco Networks, McGraw-Hill Companies, 2006.
[3]	Michael Sudkovitch, David I. Roitman, OSPF Security Project – Technion Institute of Technology, 2010.
[4]	Vanessa Antoine, Raymond Bongiorni et al, Router Security Configuration Guide, National Security Agency [C4-040R-02], 2005.
[5]	Faraz Shamim, Zaheer Aziz, Troubleshooting IP Routing Protocols (CCIE® Professional Development), Cisco Press, 2002.
[6]	Brian Vetter, Feiyi Wang, S. Felix Wu, an Experimental Study of Insider Attacks for the OSPF Routing Protocol, In 5th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols, 1997.
[7]	S. F. Wu, H.C. Chang, F. Jou, F. Wang, F. Gong, C. Sargor, JiNao: Design and Implementation of Scalable Intrusion Detection System for the OSPF Routing Protocol, DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition. DISCEX'00, 1999 , Pages 69-83, IEEE Article, 1999.
[8]	John Moy, OSPF Version 2, IETF RFC 2328, April 1998. https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2328.txt
[9]	Emanuele Jones, Olivier Le Moigne, OSPF Security Vulnerabilities Analysis, Internet Draft: draft-jones-ospf-vuln-01.txt, IETF 58 –RPSEC Working Group, November 2003.
[10]	Daniel Mende, Rene Graf, Enno Rey, Christopher Werny, Burning Asgard, an Introduction to the Tool Loki, Black Hat Digital Self Defense Conference USA, 2010 Jul 05.
[11]	Wendell Odom, CCNP ROUTE 642-902, Cisco Press, 2010.
[12]	Infonetics Research, "Enterprise Routers Quarterly Market Share, Size, and Forecasts", May 2012
[13]	Esmail Kaffashi, Hamid Rezaei rahvard, “Discovered a new security hole in OSPF routing protocol”, 16th conference of National Association of Electrical Engineering, Iran, Kazeroon, August 2013.

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APA Style

Esmail Kaffashi, Ahmad Madadi Mousavi, Hamid Rezaei Rahvard, Sahar Hemmatian Bojnordi, Forough Khademsadegh, et al. (2014). A New Attack on Link-State Database in Open Shortest Path First Routing Protocol. Journal of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, 3(2-1), 39-45. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19

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ACS Style

Esmail Kaffashi; Ahmad Madadi Mousavi; Hamid Rezaei Rahvard; Sahar Hemmatian Bojnordi; Forough Khademsadegh, et al. A New Attack on Link-State Database in Open Shortest Path First Routing Protocol. J. Electr. Electron. Eng. 2014, 3(2-1), 39-45. doi: 10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19

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AMA Style

Esmail Kaffashi, Ahmad Madadi Mousavi, Hamid Rezaei Rahvard, Sahar Hemmatian Bojnordi, Forough Khademsadegh, et al. A New Attack on Link-State Database in Open Shortest Path First Routing Protocol. J Electr Electron Eng. 2014;3(2-1):39-45. doi: 10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19

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@article{10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19,
  author = {Esmail Kaffashi and Ahmad Madadi Mousavi and Hamid Rezaei Rahvard and Sahar Hemmatian Bojnordi and Forough Khademsadegh and Soheila Amirian},
  title = {A New Attack on Link-State Database in Open Shortest Path First Routing Protocol},
  journal = {Journal of Electrical and Electronic Engineering},
  volume = {3},
  number = {2-1},
  pages = {39-45},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jeee.s.2015030201.19},
  abstract = {Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol known as interior gateway of routing protocol is a major competitor for Cisco's EIGRP of a special routing protocol. Most attacks on this protocol are based on LSA fake router which the attacker has control over it. These attacks can affect the part of the routing domain or cause severe damage based on the strategic location of the router in the AS to bring domain routing. Attacks that cause much damage to a network security mechanism and enables fight-back will not have effect on routing domain. In this paper we will describe an attack that can arbitrarily change the routing domain routing table with harmfully threats without fight back mechanism enabled.},
 year = {2014}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - A New Attack on Link-State Database in Open Shortest Path First Routing Protocol
AU  - Esmail Kaffashi
AU  - Ahmad Madadi Mousavi
AU  - Hamid Rezaei Rahvard
AU  - Sahar Hemmatian Bojnordi
AU  - Forough Khademsadegh
AU  - Soheila Amirian
Y1  - 2014/12/30
PY  - 2014
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19
DO  - 10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19
T2  - Journal of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
JF  - Journal of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
JO  - Journal of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
SP  - 39
EP  - 45
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2329-1605
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19
AB  - Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol known as interior gateway of routing protocol is a major competitor for Cisco's EIGRP of a special routing protocol. Most attacks on this protocol are based on LSA fake router which the attacker has control over it. These attacks can affect the part of the routing domain or cause severe damage based on the strategic location of the router in the AS to bring domain routing. Attacks that cause much damage to a network security mechanism and enables fight-back will not have effect on routing domain. In this paper we will describe an attack that can arbitrarily change the routing domain routing table with harmfully threats without fight back mechanism enabled.
VL  - 3
IS  - 2-1
ER  -

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Author Information

Esmail Kaffashi

Information Technology and Computer Engineering Department, Amirkabir University of Technology (Tehran Polytechnic), Tehran, Iran
Ahmad Madadi Mousavi

Information Technology and Computer Engineering Department, Amirkabir University of Technology (Tehran Polytechnic), Tehran, Iran
Hamid Rezaei Rahvard

Pardazeshgaran Gam Aval, Mashhad, Iran
Sahar Hemmatian Bojnordi

Industrial department, University of Applied Science, SID Bojnourd Center, Bojnourd, Iran
Forough Khademsadegh

Information Technology and Computer Engineering Department, Amirkabir University of Technology (Tehran Polytechnic), Tehran, Iran
Soheila Amirian

Information Technology and Computer Engineering Department, Amirkabir University of Technology (Tehran Polytechnic), Tehran, Iran

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Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Esmail Kaffashi, Ahmad Madadi Mousavi, Hamid Rezaei Rahvard, Sahar Hemmatian Bojnordi, Forough Khademsadegh, et al. (2014). A New Attack on Link-State Database in Open Shortest Path First Routing Protocol. Journal of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, 3(2-1), 39-45. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19

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ACS Style

Esmail Kaffashi; Ahmad Madadi Mousavi; Hamid Rezaei Rahvard; Sahar Hemmatian Bojnordi; Forough Khademsadegh, et al. A New Attack on Link-State Database in Open Shortest Path First Routing Protocol. J. Electr. Electron. Eng. 2014, 3(2-1), 39-45. doi: 10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19

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AMA Style

Esmail Kaffashi, Ahmad Madadi Mousavi, Hamid Rezaei Rahvard, Sahar Hemmatian Bojnordi, Forough Khademsadegh, et al. A New Attack on Link-State Database in Open Shortest Path First Routing Protocol. J Electr Electron Eng. 2014;3(2-1):39-45. doi: 10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19,
  author = {Esmail Kaffashi and Ahmad Madadi Mousavi and Hamid Rezaei Rahvard and Sahar Hemmatian Bojnordi and Forough Khademsadegh and Soheila Amirian},
  title = {A New Attack on Link-State Database in Open Shortest Path First Routing Protocol},
  journal = {Journal of Electrical and Electronic Engineering},
  volume = {3},
  number = {2-1},
  pages = {39-45},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jeee.s.2015030201.19},
  abstract = {Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol known as interior gateway of routing protocol is a major competitor for Cisco's EIGRP of a special routing protocol. Most attacks on this protocol are based on LSA fake router which the attacker has control over it. These attacks can affect the part of the routing domain or cause severe damage based on the strategic location of the router in the AS to bring domain routing. Attacks that cause much damage to a network security mechanism and enables fight-back will not have effect on routing domain. In this paper we will describe an attack that can arbitrarily change the routing domain routing table with harmfully threats without fight back mechanism enabled.},
 year = {2014}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - A New Attack on Link-State Database in Open Shortest Path First Routing Protocol
AU  - Esmail Kaffashi
AU  - Ahmad Madadi Mousavi
AU  - Hamid Rezaei Rahvard
AU  - Sahar Hemmatian Bojnordi
AU  - Forough Khademsadegh
AU  - Soheila Amirian
Y1  - 2014/12/30
PY  - 2014
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19
DO  - 10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19
T2  - Journal of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
JF  - Journal of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
JO  - Journal of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
SP  - 39
EP  - 45
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2329-1605
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jeee.s.2015030201.19
AB  - Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol known as interior gateway of routing protocol is a major competitor for Cisco's EIGRP of a special routing protocol. Most attacks on this protocol are based on LSA fake router which the attacker has control over it. These attacks can affect the part of the routing domain or cause severe damage based on the strategic location of the router in the AS to bring domain routing. Attacks that cause much damage to a network security mechanism and enables fight-back will not have effect on routing domain. In this paper we will describe an attack that can arbitrarily change the routing domain routing table with harmfully threats without fight back mechanism enabled.
VL  - 3
IS  - 2-1
ER  -

Copy | Download